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We consider a model of a TV oligopoly where TV channels transmit advertising and viewers 
dislike such commercials. We show that advertisers make a lower profit the larger the number 
of TV channels. If TV channels are sufficiently close substitutes, there will be underprovision 
of advertising relative to social optimum. We also find that the more viewers dislike ads, the 
more likely it is that welfare is increasing in the number of advertising financed TV channels. 
A publicly owned TV channel can partly correct market distortions, in some cases by having a 
larger amount of advertising than private TV channels. It may even have advertising in cases 
where advertising is wasteful per se. 
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The TV industry is important both in terms of the time people spend watching TV
and the amount of advertising it transmits.1 However, advertising-ﬁnanced channels
are potentially a mixed blessing. On the one hand, TV commercials may be the most
eﬃcient way for ﬁrms to advertise their products and can generate a surplus both for
individual ﬁrms and for society as a whole. On the other hand, viewers may dislike
being interrupted by commercials.2 We thus have an ambiguity that raises the questions
of whether there is over- or underprovision of advertising on TV and of whether there
is a need for some kind of public intervention in the sector. Would it for instance be
advantageous to restrict entry of commercial TV channels if consumers dislike ads?
In this paper, we set out to provide answers to these questions with the help of a
simple model in which TV stations sell advertising space to advertisers. The basis for
the advertisers’ willingness to pay for such advertising space is the attention of the TV
viewers that the stations attract. And in order to attract viewers, the stations oﬀer TV
programs. Thus, the TV industry is an example of a two-sided market: TV stations
oﬀer programs to viewers and advertising space to advertisers, with externalities in
both directions.3 We ﬁnd that there is too little advertising on TV when the channels’
programs are close substitutes, and that the scope for such underprovision of advertising
increases when the number of TV channels increases. We further show that the more
viewers dislike ads, the more likely it is that welfare is increasing in the number of
advertising ﬁnanced TV channels.
Well-known discussions of the welfare eﬀects of advertising, such as Dixit and Nor-
man (1978) and Becker and Murphy (1993), do not take into account the role of media
ﬁrms as transmitters of advertising.4 An early attempt to do so is in Spence and Owen
(1977). However, in their discussion of advertising-ﬁnanced TV vs. pay TV, the pres-
ence of advertising is assumed to have no eﬀect on viewers. Wildman and Owen (1985)
extend the Spence-Owen model to take into account that commercials are a nuisance
to TV viewers. Our analysis diﬀers from the work of Spence-Owen and Wildman-Owen
in that we model strategic interactions between TV stations in an oligopoly, whereas
they assume monopolistic competition without any strategic interaction. Moreover, in
these model the price of commercials is exogenously determined, whereas we let it be
endogenously determined. This is important for understanding strategic interaction
1In 1995, the average adult male American spent 17.3 hours watching TV each week (Robin-
son and Godbey, 1999). In 2002, TV advertising in the US amounted to approximately USD 50
billion, out of a total of approximately USD 115 billion spent on advertising (see Advertising Age,
http://www.adage.com/images/random/lna03.pdf).
2It is documented that viewers try to avoid advertising breaks, see for example Moriarty and Everett
(1994) and Danaher (1995). See also Wilbur (2005), who estimates a model of TV competition and
ﬁnds viewers’ disutility from advertising to be signiﬁcant and positive.
3To be precise, advertisers impose negative externalities on viewers, while viewers impose posi-
tive externalities on advertisers. For general introductions to the theory of two-sided markets, see
Armstrong (2005a) and Rochet and Tirole (2005).
4For a survey of the economics literature on advertising, see Bagwell (2005).
2in media markets. For example, we show that tougher competition caused by greater
substitutability between TV channels leads to higher advertising prices, while tougher
competition caused by an increase in the number of TV channels leads to lower adver-
tising prices. In other respects, however, our approach is similar to that of Spence and
Owen (1977) and Wildman and Owen (1985). In particular, we follow them in modeling
the demand for TV programs by way of a quadratic utility function of a representative
viewer.
In recent analyses of the media market, such as Gal-Or and Dukes (2003), Gab-
szewicz, et al. (2004), Anderson and Gabszewicz (2005), and Peitz and Valletti (2005),
viewers are located along a Hotelling (1929) line, varying according to their preferences
for TV-program content, and TV channels choose positions on that line.5 Thereby
product diﬀerentiation is endogenously determined. But this comes at a cost: First,
these analyses are limited to discussions of duopoly and have small chances of being
generalizable to an oligopoly. Secondly a Hotelling analysis ﬁxes the total size of the
market (i.e., the total amount of TV viewing). Thirdly, each viewer is assumed to watch
one channel only. We choose a diﬀerent angle and ﬁx the degree of product diﬀerentia-
tion, in line with the earlier work of Spence and Owen (1977) and Wildman and Owen
(1985). A major beneﬁt is that we can discuss oligopoly and do not have to limit our-
selves to duopoly. This is particularly interesting since most democratic countries have
reduced or eliminated regulatory entry barriers for TV channels over the last decades.
A major insight from our analysis is that a larger number of advertising-ﬁnanced TV
channels is more likely to have positive welfare eﬀects, the higher is the consumers’
disutility from advertising. The intuition for this somewhat paradoxical result is that
more competition, in the sense of an increase in the number of TV channels, forces
each TV channel to reduce its amount of utility-reducing advertising, and the positive
welfare eﬀects of less advertising are greater the more the consumers dislike advertising,
other things equal.
Our approach allows for a framework in which the time people spend watching TV
is endogenous, depending on the extent of competition. As in most other markets,
our model features the appealing property that stronger competition leads to higher
output, i.e., to people spending more time watching TV. Finally, our formulation allows
a viewer to allocate his time between diﬀerent channels. This increases the competition
in the market for advertising space, as each TV channel can oﬀer advertisers a little of
each viewer’s attention.
In many European countries there are mixed oligopolies in the TV industry with
both publicly and privately owned TV channels.6 Introducing a welfare-maximizing
5See also the work by Anderson and Coate (2005), who do a welfare analysis in such a Hotelling-
style setting. Other contributions in the recent literature on the economic analysis of media industries
include Nilssen and Sørgard (2003), Dukes (2004), Armstrong (2005a), and Crampes, et al. (2005).
The seminal work is Steiner (1952). For a review of the early literature, see Owen and Wildman
(1992). The more recent literature is reviewed by Anderson and Gabszewicz (2005).
6See Motta and Polo (1997) for a survey of the media industry in Europe. See Armstrong (2005b)
and Armstrong and Weeds (2005) for some recent discussions on public service broadcasting.
3publicly owned TV channel into our model, we show that, for suﬃciently diﬀerentiated
TV channels, the public TV channel sells less advertising space than the private chan-
nels. Thereby the overprovision of advertising in a system with only privately owned
TV channels is mitigated. Conversely, the public TV channel brings more advertising
than the private ones if TV programs are suﬃciently close substitutes. In fact, we
ﬁnd that a welfare-maximizing public TV channel advertises even in some cases where
advertising is per se wasteful (i.e., where the disutility of viewers exceeds the surplus
that the advertising generates for the advertisers).
This article is organized as follows. The formal model is presented in the next
section, and in Section 3 we derive the equilibrium outcomes. In Section 4 we ﬁnd
social optimum, and in Section 5 we compare market equilibrium and social optimum.
In Section 6 we introduce a welfare-maximizing TV channel that is owned by the
government. Finally, we oﬀer some concluding remarks in Section 7.
2 The model
We consider a model with m ≥ 2 TV stations and a continuum of identical viewers with
measure one. The time that each viewer spends watching TV programs on channel
i =1 ,...m is denoted by Vi. We follow Motta (2004) and assume that consumers’
preferences are given by the Shubik-Levitan utility function, originally introduced by



















We may interpret Vi both as the time that each viewer spends watching channel i and
as the number of viewers of channel i, since we have normalized the population size to
1. The parameter s ∈ [0,1) is a measure of product diﬀerentiation: The higher is s,t h e
closer substitutes are the TV channels from the viewers’ point of view. The Shubik-
Levitan formulation ensures that the parameter s only captures product diﬀerentiation
and has no eﬀect on market size.7
We consider TV channels that are ﬁnanced by advertising and that viewers can
watch free of charge. Viewers have a disutility of being interrupted by commercials.
To capture this, we assume that viewers’ subjective cost of watching channel i is Ci =
γAiVi, where Ai is the level of advertising on TV channel i and γ>0 is a parameter
that measures the viewers’ disutility from advertising. A viewer’s consumer surplus is
thus given by




7Note that this is in contrast to the standard quadratic utility function, where one and the same
parameter measures both product diﬀerentiation and market size. See Motta (2004) for details.
4In a sense, advertising is an indirect price: It has the same function in the market
for TV programs as prices have in other markets.
By setting dCS









,i =1 ,...,m, (2)
where A = 1
m
Pm
i=1 Ai is the average level of advertising on the m channels. The time
viewers spend watching channel i is thus strictly decreasing in the advertising level on
that channel, and more so the higher their disutility of being interrupted by commercials
(captured by γ), and increasing in the advertising levels on the competing channels:
T h em o r ea d v e r t i s i n gt h e r ei so nt h er i v a lc h a n n e l s ,t h em o r ea t t r a c t i v ei sc h a n n e li for
the viewers.
TV channel i charges the price Ri per advertising slot. Disregarding any production
costs, we set the proﬁt of channel i equal to
Πi = RiAi,i =1 ,..,m. (3)
Let Aik denote advertiser k’s advertising level on channel i. The advertiser’s gross
gain from advertising at channel i is naturally increasing in its advertising level and
i nt h en u m b e ro fv i e w e r se x p o s e dt oi t sa d v e r t i s i n g . W em a k ei ts i m p l eb ya s s u m i n g
that the gross gain equals AikVi. This implies that the net gain for advertiser k from














where n is the number of advertisers. With a slight abuse of terminology, we label πk
the proﬁt of advertiser k. The advertisers’ aggregate proﬁte q u a l sπA ≡
Pn
k=1 πk.
Most of the analyses in the literature consider the advertisers to be price takers
and derive demand for advertising by way of a zero-proﬁt condition on the marginal
advertiser’s proﬁt.8 We ﬁnd it useful to do this diﬀerently, and more in line with
models of successive oligopoly, such as Salinger (1988), where producers and retailers
set quantities sequentially. We consider the following two-stage game:
Stage 1: TV channels set advertising levels.
Stage 2: The advertisers choose how much advertising to buy.
One noteworthy feature of our set-up is that the TV channels are quantity setters
in advertising. If program choice is inﬂexible in the short run — with a given amount of
time between each program — such an assumption is plausible. However, there might
8An exception is Gal-Or and Dukes (2003), who model pairwise negotiations between TV channels
and advertisers.
5be arguments indicating that TV channels are more ﬂexible concerning the amount of
advertising.9 If so, price setting on advertising is a more natural choice. It can be
shown that our main results still hold if we assume price setting rather than quantity
setting among TV channels.10
Unless stated otherwise, we assume that the TV channels act non-cooperatively.
3 Equilibrium outcomes
We solve the game by backward induction. At stage 2, the advertisers simultaneously
determine how much to advertise on each of the m channels, taking advertising prices
as given. Solving
∂πk
∂Aik =0simultaneously for the n advertisers and then using Ai = Pn







1 − m(1 − s)Ri − msR
¤
,i =1 ,...,m, (5)
where R = 1
m
Pm
i=1 Ri is the average advertising price on the m channels. As expected,
we thus have a downward-sloping demand curve for advertising (
dAi
dRi < 0). More in-
terestingly, we see that demand for advertising on each channel is decreasing also in
the other channels’ advertising prices (
dAi
dRj < 0,∀j 6= i). This follows from the viewers’
dislike for advertising. To see why, suppose that Rj increases, so that the advertising
level on channel j falls. This channel thereby becomes more attractive for the viewers,
while any channel i 6= j becomes relatively less attractive. The latter in turn means
that channel i will have a smaller audience, which translates into a lower demand for
advertising. As is standard in markets with this property, the TV channels’ advertising
levels are strategic complements (see Vives, 1999).
























This means that the marginal willingness to pay for advertising on a channel is increas-
ing in s if and only if the advertising level on that channel is lower than the average
9When transmitting newscasts or sport events, the TV channels are quite ﬂexible with respect to
how much advertising to show. Moreover, to accommodate a low amount of advertising a TV channel
can ﬁll in with advertising for its own programs (’tune-ins’). For details concerning tune-ins, see
Shachar and Anand (1998).
10Barros et al. (2004) formulate a model where media ﬁrms set prices of advertising rather than
quantities. The equilibrium outcomes they ﬁnd are analogous to the ones we report here. For a more
detailed discussion of price versus quantity competition in the market for TV advertising, see Nilssen
and Sørgard (2003).
6(Ai < A): The less diﬀerentiated the TV programs, the more prone viewers are to shift
from a channel with much advertising to channels with little advertising.
The TV channels set their advertising levels non-cooperatively at stage 1. (For
the case where TV channels collude on advertising levels, see below.) Solving
dΠi
dAi =










(m − s)+m(1 − s)
,i =1 ,...,m, (7)
where the superscript M d e n o t e sm a r k e te q u i l i b r i u m .F r o mt h i se q u a t i o nw es e et h a t




dn > 0: An increase in the number of advertisers increases
the demand for advertising, and it becomes optimal for the TV channels to oﬀer more
advertising space.




(n +1 )( m − s)+m(1 − s)
m(n +1 )[ ( m − s)+m(1 − s)]
,i =1 ,...,m . (8)
Multiplying this expression by m, we see that total viewing time (mV M
i ) depends
on the number and substitutability of TV channels. In other words, total sales vary
with the competitive pressure between the ﬁrms. This realistic feature of our model is
in contrast to the widely used Hotelling framework, where the size of the market by
deﬁnition is constant.
We note from (8) that TV viewers’ equilibrium consumption is unaﬀected by γ; the
TV channels completely internalize the consumers’ disutility of advertising through the
level of advertising.
From (7) we ﬁnd that
dAM
i
ds < 0, which means that the equilibrium advertising
level is lower the less diﬀerentiated the TV channels. To understand this result, note
that a TV channel attracts viewers by limiting the amount of advertising. The better
substitutes the viewers perceive the TV channels to be, the more sensitive they are to
diﬀerences in levels of advertising. A high s thus gives each TV channel an incentive to
set a relatively low advertising level in order to capture viewers from the other channel.





Finally, we get the typical eﬀects of an increase in the number of competitors: Each
ﬁrm’s output is reduced (
dAM
i
dm < 0, and
dV M
i




dm > 0, and
d(mV M
i )
dm > 0).Again, these are results that cannot be obtained in the
Hotelling framework, where mV M
i is ﬁxed.
Summarizing our main results so far, we have:
Proposition 1: (a) The larger the number of TV channels
11See also Anderson and Coate (2005).
7(i) the less time do viewers spend on each individual TV channel, but
(ii) the more time do they spend on TV viewing in total.
(b) The equilibrium level of advertising on each channel is smaller
(i) the less diﬀerentiated the TV channels’ programs;
(ii) the higher the viewers’ disutility of advertising; and
(iii) the higher the numbers of TV channels.
At the same time as competition forces the TV channels to reduce their advertising
levels, it allows them to charge a higher slotting price RM




















(n +1 )( m − s)






By insertions into the expressions for proﬁt in (3) and (4), we can now ﬁnd the








(m − s)(1− s)









(n +1 )[ ( m − s)+m(1 − s)]
¸2
. (12)
Diﬀerentiations of (11) and (12) show that proﬁts are decreasing in both γ and s.
This is natural, since the level of advertising is lower the larger the consumers’ disutility
of advertising and the closer substitutes are the TV channels’ programs.
Recall that the slotting price is higher the closer substitutes the consumers perceive
the TV channels to be. This is because reduced diﬀerentiation increases the competitive




ds < 0) and a higher equilibrium price on ads (
dRM
i
ds > 0).T h e s a m e
kind of reasoning might lead one to expect that the slotting price also increases in the




dm < 0. The intuition is that the market power of each TV channel falls when
the number of channels increases. This forces the TV channels to reduce the slotting
prices.






), on the other hand, is unambiguously
increasing in the competitive pressure [if s ∈ (0,1)]. This holds whether the higher






ds > 0. It thus becomes more expensive for the advertisers to reach each viewer
the larger the number of channels. We therefore get the somewhat surprising result




We summarize our results concerning proﬁts:
Proposition 2: Equilibrium proﬁts for both TV channels and advertisers are higher
(i) the more diﬀerentiated the TV channels’ programs,
(ii) the lower the viewers’ disutility of advertising, and
(iii) the lower the number of TV channels.
We note that a lower advertising level on each channel is an advantage for consumers.
Additionally, consumers gain because an increase in m means that the diversity of TV
channels increases. We thus unambiguously have dCS
dm > 0.
We end this section with an extension to the case where there is collusion among
the TV channels about levels of advertising. When s =0 , the TV channels’ programs
are independent, and collusion has no eﬀect at all. At the other extreme, we know
that the TV channels compete away (almost) all advertising and have close to zero
proﬁts when s approaches 1. This is a prisoners’ dilemma situation, where the ﬁrms
would have been jointly better oﬀ with more advertising on all channels. This suggests
that collusion between the TV channels leads to more advertising than in the non-
cooperative equilibrium for all s ∈ (0,1), and more so the less diﬀerentiated the TV
programs.12 We derive the ﬁrst-order conditions for a collusive outcome from the TV
channels’ joint proﬁt-maximization problem. We ﬁnd that the equilibrium advertising








,i =1 ,...,m. (13)
where the superscript C denotes collusion. Note that diﬀe r e n t i a t i o na ss u c hd o e sn o t
play any role if the TV channels collude. The reason is that a reduction in diﬀerentiation
has no competitive eﬀect in a collusive outcome, and therefore does not trigger any
change in the chosen level of advertising.
By substituting AC
i into the expressions for proﬁt in (3) and (4), we ﬁnd proﬁts for















2,i =1 ,...,m, k =1 ,...,n.
The following can now be established:
12When viewers dislike ads, advertising is like an indirect price of watching TV. Collusion enables
TV channels to increase this indirect price and thus have more advertising. Our analysis relates to the
informal discussion in Wildman (1998), who points out that introducing viewer disutility of advertising
provides a tendency for advertising to be higher when TV channels collude than when they compete.
The question is also discussed in Masson, et al. (1990), but their analysis disregards any externalities
between viewers and advertisers.
9Proposition 3: For any s ∈ (0,1), advertising levels and proﬁts, for both TV
channels and advertisers, are higher when the TV channels collude on advertising than
when they act non-cooperatively.
We see from Proposition 3 that also the advertisers gain when the TV channels
collude. The reason is that such collusion increases the amount of advertising, and
reduces the contact price per viewer.
4 Social optimum
We express welfare as the sum of consumers’ surplus and TV channels’ and advertisers’
proﬁts:







With a total of
Pm
i=1 Ai advertising slots on the m TV channels, the advertisers have an
aggregate gross gain from advertising on TV equal to
Pm
i=1 AiVi. The money-equivalent
consumer disutility from this advertising equals γ (
Pm
i=1 AiVi). In order to cultivate the
mechanisms that could make the media market underprovide advertising, we assume
that no additional consumer surplus is generated by the sales of products triggered
by TV advertising. (We could clearly have too little advertising if this extra surplus
were assumed to be high.) With this set-up, we thus ‘minimize’ the social gains from
advertising. Accordingly, we can express welfare as







From the welfare function, we immediately see that advertising on TV is socially
beneﬁcial if and only if γ<1. In contrast, there will be advertising in market equi-
librium even when γ ≥ 1. Formally, by solving dW
dAi =0 ,i=1 ,...,m, subject to






γ(2−γ), if 0 <γ<1
0, if γ ≥ 1
(16)
Note that the socially optimal amount of advertising is independent of how close
substitutes the TV channels’ programs are (i.e.,i ti si n d e p e n d e n to fs). This is natural,
since commercials are equally disturbing for the consumers regardless of the extent of
horizontal diﬀerentiation between the TV channels. The optimal level of advertising
is thus only a function of γ, the viewers’ disutility parameter. Diﬀerentiation of (16)
shows the intuitively obvious result that A∗
i is decreasing in consumers’ disutility of
advertising for γ ∈ (0,1).
Inserting for A∗




2γ(2−γ), if 0 <γ<1
1
2, if γ ≥ 1.
(17)
From (17) we see that dW∗
dγ < 0 for γ ∈ (0,1). The reason for this relationship is
two-fold. First, consumer surplus is decreasing in γ. T h i si sad i r e c te ﬀect. Second,
t h e r ei sa ni n d i r e c te ﬀect through the advertising level. We know that higher disutility
leads to a lower amount of advertising in social optimum (
dA∗
i
dγ < 0 for γ ∈ (0,1)). This
results in a reduction in society’s use of value-enhancing TV commercials.
To sum up, we have:
Proposition 4: In social optimum, advertising levels and welfare are decreasing
in viewers’ disutility from advertising, and there is no advertising in optimum if this
disutility is suﬃciently high (i.e., if γ ≥ 1). Optimum advertising and welfare are,
however, independent of the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
5A c o m p a r i s o n
The equilibrium outcome depends on whether TV channels compete or collude with
respect to levels of advertising. We ﬁrst compare the social optimum with the non-
cooperative, or market, equilibrium, and then with the collusive equilibrium.
In market equilibrium there will be advertising for all values of γ, while it is socially
o p t i m a lt oh a v en oa d v e r t i s i n gi fγ ≥ 1. The excess level of advertising on each channel
in market equilibrium in this case is trivially given by equation (7). The interesting
case to consider is therefore γ<1. Using equations (7) and (16) and suppressing
subscripts, we ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between advertising levels in social optimum and




(m − 1)(n − 1+γ)+nγ
γ (2 − γ)(n +1 )[ m(1 − s)+m − s]
(s − ˆ s), (18)
where
ˆ s =
m[γ (n +2 )− 2] + 2s(1 − γ)
(m − 1)(n − 1+γ)+nγ
. (19)
Both the numerator and the denominator in the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side
of (18) are positive. We therefore see that there is too much advertising in market
equilibrium (AM >A ∗)i fa n do n l yi fs<ˆ s. The driving force behind this result is the
fact that TV stations have high market power over their viewers when the channels’
program contents are poor substitutes (s small). The TV channels exploit this market
power by selling a larger amount of advertising slots to the advertisers, even though
this reduces viewers’ utility from watching TV. However, competition for viewers forces
the TV channels to reduce their level of advertising, and this competition is stronger
the closer substitutes their programs. Indeed, as seen from (7), independent of viewers’
disutility of advertising, the equilibrium advertising level goes to zero in the limit as
11s approaches one. This is obviously below social optimum if γ<1. More generally,
competition between the TV channels is so tough if s>ˆ s that there is underprovision
of advertising in equilibrium. Naturally, dˆ s
dγ > 0: the higher the viewer’s disutility from
advertising, the smaller is the range of s for which there is underprovision of advertising.
In addition, we see that dˆ s
dm < 0. This means that the range of s for which there is too
little advertising is an increasing function of m. This follows from the equilibrium level
of advertising on each channel being decreasing in m (cf. Proposition 1). We have:
Proposition 5: (a) There is too little advertising in equilibrium if the TV channels’
programs are close substitutes, in particular if s>ˆ s, and too much advertising if s<ˆ s.
(b) The range (b s,1) of values for s for which there is too little advertising gets
larger the lower the viewers’ disutility from advertising and the larger the number of
TV channels.




[m(1 − s)+( n +1 )( m − s)][γ (n +1 )( m − s)+m(1 − s)(γ +2 n)]
2γ [(m − s)+m(1 − s)]
2 (n +1 )
2 (20)




(m − 1)[(m − 1)(n − 1+γ)+nγ]
γ [(m − s)+m(1 − s)]
3 (n +1 )








m[(m − 1)(n − 1+γ)+nγ]
γ [(m − s)+m(1 − s)]
2 (n +1 )
2 (s − ˆ s).
There is too much advertising in market equilibrium if s<ˆ s. In this case, an in-
crease in s or a reduction in n (corresponding to a downward-shift in the demand for
advertising) results in higher welfare, since less product diﬀerentiation or a smaller
number of advertisers would result in less advertising. Likewise, more product diﬀer-
entiation and a larger number of advertisers would be welfare improving if s>ˆ s, since
in this case there will be too little advertising from a social point of view. Indeed, if
the consumers’ disutility of advertising is suﬃciently low, even a monopoly TV station
(s =0 ) will have too little advertising from a social point of view if n is small.
The relationship between advertising in market equilibrium and in social optimum
is illustrated in the left-hand side panel of Figure 1, where we have set m =2and
γ = 1
3. The curves labelled AM
n=1 and AM
n correspond to equilibrium in the case of
n =1and n →∞advertisers, respectively. For all s<1, the latter curve has the
higher values. This is because the equilibrium level of advertising is increasing in n.
The social optimum, on the other hand, is independent of n. The right-hand side panel
of Figure 1 shows the corresponding relationship between channel diﬀerentiation and
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Figure 1: Comparison between social optimum and market equilibrium (m =2and
γ = 1
3).
Since an increase in m means that proﬁts fall and consumer surplus increases, it is




ns(1 − s)[(2m − s(1 + n + m))(γ − 1) + nm(γ − s)]
γ [(m − s)+m(1 − s)]
3 (n +1 )
2 T 0. (21)




n(1 − s)s[ns(m − 1) + 2m − s(1 + m)]
γ2 [(m − s)+m(1 − s)]
3 (n +1 )
2 > 0. (22)
Equation (22) has the non-trivial implication that the welfare eﬀect of a larger number
of advertising-ﬁnanced TV channels is more likely to be positive the higher the viewers’
disutility from advertising. The intuition is quite clear: Competition in the form of an
extra TV channel forces each of the existing channels to reduce its level of advertising,
and the social gain from this is higher the more consumers dislike advertising.
Summing up, we have
Proposition 6: Suppose the number of TV channels increases.
(i) The proﬁt levels of both TV channels and advertisers fall, while consumer surplus
increases, so that the eﬀect on total welfare is ambiguous.
(ii) Aggregate welfare is more likely to increase the larger the viewers’ disutility of
advertising.
13Finally, let us compare the collusive outcome with the social optimum. When the
TV channels collude, they are able to counter the eﬀect of product diﬀerentiation.
Therefore, advertising levels will be independent of s. This is true also for social opti-
mum, and by comparing (13) and (16) we ﬁnd:
Proposition 7: In an equilibrium in which the TV channels collude on advertising,
there is too little advertising if γ< 2
n+2 and too much advertising if γ> 2
n+2.
We know that a shift from competition to collusion leads to more advertising. How-
ever, Proposition 7 shows that there can be underprovision of advertising even with
collusion. The reason for this is that, for any ﬁnite number of n, the advertisers will
have some market power over the TV channels (‘monopsony power’). All else equal,
this means that demand for advertising is too small from a social point of view. Only in
the limit as n →∞will it be true that collusion between the TV channels necessarily
generates too much advertising.
6 Public policy: Mixed duopoly
The analysis above suggests that the level of advertising in market equilibrium may be
too high from a social point of view, particularly if the TV channels are poor substitutes.
In this case a public regulation that places an upper limit on the level of advertising may
be a welfare enhancing policy. Such a policy has been implemented in many countries.13
Obviously, binding restrictions on the amount of advertising are detrimental to welfare
if the market provides too few commercials. Regulation of advertising levels on private
TV channels has proven to be increasingly diﬃcult over time. One reason for this is
that the regulators are exposed to lobbying pressure. Another reason, which is probably
more important (and increases the power of lobbyists), is that technological progress
and increased globalization make it increasingly more diﬃcult to enforce an eﬃcient
regulation policy towards private TV channels.14 It is natural to ask, therefore, how
governments can aﬀect the equilibrium outcome through ownership of a TV station.
The presence of one public and one or more major private TV channels (mixed
13The EU restricts TV advertising to 9 minutes on average, with a maximum of 12 minutes in any
given hour, while some of the member states have stricter limits. See details in Anderson (2005) and
Motta and Polo (1997). In the US, the National Association of Broadcasters at one time set an upper
limit. In 1981, this was found to violate antitrust laws (see Owen and Wildman, 1992, ch. 5, and Hull,
1990). No restrictions (except for advertising on children’s programs) exist in the US today.
14One example of this comes from Norway, where there are restrictions on allowed advertising levels.
Even though these restrictions have become less severe over time, the private station TV3, owned by
Modern Times Group AB, has chosen to broadcast from the UK to the Norwegian market in order to
avoid the Norwegian restrictions on advertising levels. Thus, it is not merely an empty threat when TV
stations argue that they will serve the market from abroad if there is a strict regulation of advertising
levels.
14oligopoly) is common in many European countries.15 While public TV channels histor-
ically have not been ﬁnanced by advertising, this has gradually changed over time (e.g.,
by allowing ﬁrms to sponsor programs). The main reason for the change is the fact
that expensive sport events have made it politically more diﬃcult to ﬁnance public TV
channels through licenses. However, we will not consider this ﬁnancial aspect. Instead,
we consider a situation where the government owns channel 1 (TV1), which maximizes
welfare (W) with respect to its own level of advertising. The advertising levels on the
other channels are assumed to be unregulated.
The TV channels simultaneously set advertising levels at stage 1 and the advertisers
decide how much advertising to buy at stage 2. The advertising level at channel 1 is set
according to A1 =a r gm a xW, while for the other channels we solve Ai =a r gm a xΠi,
i =2 ,...,m.We consider only the non-cooperative outcome.
Independently of who owns the TV channels, the outcome of stage 2 is given by
equation (6). Provided that all TV channels have positive advertising levels, we ﬁnd




1 = m(1 − s)
[(m − 2) + γ]ns + m[2(1 + n) − s](1− γ)
γ (2 − γ)(n +1 )
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i = m(1 − s)
nm(2 − γ) − s(n + γ − 1)
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We see that the potential problem of no advertising at all as s approaches 1 remains
unsolved even with a government-owned TV channel. The reason is that, since the TV
channels are almost perfect substitutes in this case, imposing advertising on the public
channel would make all viewers watch the private channels.
In Section 5 above, we found that there is too little advertising in equilibrium if





i = m(1 − s)
(m − 1)(n − 1+γ)+nγ
γ (2 − γ)(1+n)
£
m2 (1 − s)+( m − s)
2¤ (s − ˆ s).
This means that the publicly owned TV channel will advertise more than a private,
proﬁt-maximizing TV channel if and only if s>ˆ s. This is quite natural, since, by so
15There are several studies of mixed duopoly, see for example De Fraja and Delbono (1989) and
Cremer et al. (1991). Nilssen and Sørgard (2002) present, as far as we know, the only mixed-
oligopoly study relating to the media industry. However, their study is a Hotelling model, not capturing
consumers’ disutility from advertising. In a related study, Nilssen (2000) discusses mixed oligopoly
in a payments market where, not unlike the present media context, there are negative externalities
among ﬁrms in addition to the traditional oligopoly externality.
16The only instance where not all TV channels have positive advertising levels for s<1 is when
the expression in (23) is negative so that the public channel’s equilibrium level is zero. This turns the
industry into an industry with (m − 1) proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms. This happens when γ>e γ,d e ﬁned
below.
15doing, it partly corrects for the underprovision of advertising that would have been the
case if all channels had been private, proﬁt-maximizing entities.
Figure 2 illustrates the diﬀerence between the advertising levels when γ = 1
3 and
m =2for the limit case n →∞ . In the neighborhood of s = 1
2, we see that the public
channel advertises increasingly more than the private channel the closer substitutes the
TV stations are. However, since the Bertrand-paradox style result that there will be
no advertising in the limit as the channels are about to become perfect substitutes is












Figure 2: The diﬀerence in advertising between the public and the private channel
(for m =2 ,γ= 1
3, and n →∞ ).
Suppose that γ>1, in which case there will be no advertising in social opti-
mum. Does this mean that a public TV channel in a mixed duopoly should carry
no advertising? — No, not necessarily. From equation (23) we ﬁnd that A1 > 0 if
γ<˜ γ ≡ 1+
ns(m−1)
n(2m−s)+m(2−s), where ˜ γ is strictly increasing in s, m, and n. Since ˜ γ is
greater than 1, we see that the government may ﬁnd it optimal to allow advertising on
its own channel even when advertising is wasteful as such. This is because public-channel
advertising has an indirect positive eﬀect on the surplus generated by the private TV
channels. To see this, suppose γ =1 , so that advertising has neither a positive nor a
16negative social value per se.T h ed i r e c te ﬀect of a marginal increase in A1 is to generate
some proﬁtf o rTV1 that is exactly matched by a loss in consumer surplus. However,
the indirect eﬀe c to ft h ei n c r e a s ei nA1 is to make the private channels relatively more
attractive for any given advertising level Ai. Thereby, the private channels will observe
a positive shift in its demand for advertising and thus have a non-marginal increase in
proﬁts. The net eﬀect of the higher A1 is thus to improve welfare due to the higher
proﬁtl e v e lf o ri t sr i v a l s . From this, it follows that it must be optimal to set A1 strictly
positive when γ =1 .B yc o n t i n u i t y ,t h es a m em u s tb et r u ea l s oi fγ is somewhat larger
than 1.17
We can summarize our results as follows:
Proposition 8: (a) In a mixed oligopoly the public TV channel has more advertis-
ing than the private ones if and only if s>ˆ s.
(b) The public TV channel may carry advertising even when advertising is socially
wasteful, and this happens for 1 <γ<˜ γ.
Part (b) of Proposition 8 is illustrated graphically in Figure 3 for m =2 , γ =1 .1,
and n →∞ . The curve labelled AP






























Figure 3: Advertising levels when advertising is intrinsically wasteful (for m =2 ,
γ = 1.1 and n →∞ ).
17Note that there is no reason to set A1 > 0 if γ ≥ 1 and s =0 . The reason for this is that the TV
channels’ programs now are completely independent, so that the advertising level on TV1 does not
have any indirect eﬀect on the proﬁt levels of the other channels.
18The curve for AP
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2−s. This can be found by using equations (3) and (6).
177 Concluding remarks
We have modeled the media ﬁrm as an intermediate player that transmits advertising
to consumers. Our starting point is that advertising-ﬁnanced TV is a mixed bless-
ing. Advertising is good for the sales of products because it generates proﬁt, and bad
for viewers because they typically dislike being interrupted by commercials on TV.
However, we have shown that underprovision of advertising may happen when the TV
channels compete to attract viewers for the advertising they bring. In particular, such
underprovision is more likely the less diﬀerentiated the TV channels’ programs.
We also point out that the nature of competition as such may be crucial for whether
there is over- or underprovision of advertising on TV. If the TV channels collude on
advertising, they will succeed in having a relatively large amount of advertising on TV.
However, as shown above, there may be underprovision of advertising even in this case.
From a public-policy point of view, it is important to note that, since advertising is
easily observable, there might be scope for collusive behavior between TV channels. If
TV channels are observed to advertise a lot even in a situation where their programs
appear to be rather close substitutes, this is an indication that there is collusion on
advertising.
On the question of whether a policy of removing public barriers to entry for advertising-
ﬁnanced TV channels would be negative from a welfare point of view, we ﬁnd, somewhat
paradoxically, that there may be good reasons to encourage such entry if consumers
have a strong distaste for advertising.
Our analysis is based on the notion that the degree of product diﬀerentiation, as
represented by the parameter s, is observed and known by everybody, including the
social planner. One can certainly envision a richer model where there is uncertainty
about this feature of viewers’ preferences. This could be an interesting extension, not
least from a policy point of view. However, we believe that there will be no qualitative
changes in the mechanisms we have highlighted even if such uncertainty is introduced.
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